chahinebrini cb5c193980 fix(mail/oauth): add email OIDC scope — id_token Email-Claim für Personal-Accounts
Microsoft Personal-Accounts (outlook.com, hotmail.com, live.com) liefern mit
`openid` allein keinen `email`-Claim ins ID-Token. `preferred_username` ist
ein Display-Identifier, oft die Login-Email — aber nicht garantiert. Bei
manchen Account-Konfigurationen ist der Claim leer oder enthält einen MS-
internen Identifier.

Fix: `email` als zusätzlichen OIDC-Standard-Scope. `email` ist ein "identity
scope" (wie openid/profile/offline_access) und damit per OIDC-Spezifikation
mit jedem Resource-Scope (auch IMAP.AccessAsUser.All) kompatibel — verursacht
KEIN AADSTS70011 mehr.

Azure-App-Permissions müssen nicht angepasst werden — OIDC-Identity-Scopes
brauchen keine explizite Admin-Permission-Grant.

extractEmailFromIdToken bleibt unverändert — die Lookup-Order `email →
preferred_username → upn` greift jetzt erstmal auf den frischen `email`-Claim.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-05-13 22:21:31 +02:00

193 lines
6.9 KiB
TypeScript

/**
* Microsoft Identity Platform — OAuth2 PKCE utilities.
*
* Tenant: 'common' — covers consumer Outlook/Hotmail/Live/MSN accounts
* AND Microsoft 365 work/school accounts. Decision: common > consumers because
* the Azure App Registration was created as Multi-Tenant + Personal Accounts.
*
* Public Client / No Client-Secret — PKCE (S256) is the security mechanism.
* Microsoft explicitly supports PKCE without client_secret for public clients
* (mobile/native apps). See: https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/entra/identity-platform/v2-oauth2-auth-code-flow
*/
import { createHash, randomBytes } from "crypto";
const MS_TENANT = "common";
const MS_TOKEN_ENDPOINT = `https://login.microsoftonline.com/${MS_TENANT}/oauth2/v2.0/token`;
export const MS_AUTH_BASE = `https://login.microsoftonline.com/${MS_TENANT}/oauth2/v2.0/authorize`;
/**
* OAuth scopes requested.
* Matches the DSGVO-Memo Section 4.3 (Datenminimierung).
*
* Single-resource constraint: Microsoft V2.0 erlaubt im /token-Exchange nur
* Scopes EINES Resource-Servers. IMAP.AccessAsUser.All zielt auf
* outlook.office.com, User.Read auf graph.microsoft.com — die Kombination
* wirft `AADSTS70011: scopes are not compatible with each other`.
*
* Daher: KEIN User.Read. Email-Adresse kommt aus dem id_token-Claim
* `preferred_username` (openid-Scope reicht). Falls künftig der Display-Name
* gebraucht wird → separater Microsoft-Graph-Token-Exchange (OBO-Pattern).
*/
export const MS_OAUTH_SCOPES = [
"https://outlook.office.com/IMAP.AccessAsUser.All",
"offline_access",
"openid",
// Standard-OIDC-Scope: liefert `email`-Claim ins id_token. Microsoft Personal-
// Accounts geben mit `openid` allein keinen Email-Claim raus (preferred_username
// ist Display-Identifier, kein garantiertes Email-Feld). `email` ist ein OIDC-
// "identity scope" und damit per Definition kompatibel mit jeder Resource-API
// — verursacht KEIN AADSTS70011 mit dem IMAP-Scope.
"email",
].join(" ");
/**
* The redirect_uri registered in the Azure App Registration for the native client.
* Must match exactly what the client sends — scheme registered in app.json.
*/
export const MS_REDIRECT_URI = "rebreak://auth/mail-oauth-callback";
// ── PKCE Helpers ─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
/** Generates a cryptographically random code_verifier (43-128 chars, URL-safe). */
export function generateCodeVerifier(): string {
// 96 random bytes → 128 base64url chars (well within PKCE 43-128 range)
return randomBytes(96).toString("base64url");
}
/** Computes S256 code_challenge from the verifier. */
export function computeCodeChallenge(verifier: string): string {
return createHash("sha256").update(verifier).digest("base64url");
}
/** Generates a random state ID for CSRF protection (hex, 32 chars = 128 bits). */
export function generateStateId(): string {
return randomBytes(16).toString("hex");
}
// ── Token Exchange ────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
export interface MicrosoftTokenResponse {
access_token: string;
/** Microsoft ALWAYS returns a refresh_token when offline_access scope is included. */
refresh_token: string;
/** Seconds until access_token expires (typically 3600 for MS). */
expires_in: number;
scope: string;
token_type: string;
/** JWT containing user claims (email, sub, etc.). Returned because openid scope is included. */
id_token?: string;
}
/**
* Exchanges an authorization_code for tokens.
* Called from callback endpoint after state validation.
*/
export async function exchangeCodeForTokens(params: {
clientId: string;
code: string;
codeVerifier: string;
}): Promise<MicrosoftTokenResponse> {
const body = new URLSearchParams({
grant_type: "authorization_code",
client_id: params.clientId,
code: params.code,
redirect_uri: MS_REDIRECT_URI,
code_verifier: params.codeVerifier,
scope: MS_OAUTH_SCOPES,
});
const res = await fetch(MS_TOKEN_ENDPOINT, {
method: "POST",
headers: { "Content-Type": "application/x-www-form-urlencoded" },
body: body.toString(),
});
if (!res.ok) {
const errText = await res.text().catch(() => "unknown error");
throw new Error(`MS token exchange failed (${res.status}): ${errText}`);
}
const data = await res.json() as MicrosoftTokenResponse;
if (!data.access_token || !data.refresh_token) {
throw new Error("MS token response missing access_token or refresh_token");
}
return data;
}
/**
* Refreshes a Microsoft access_token using a refresh_token.
*
* CRITICAL: Microsoft rotates refresh_tokens — the response may contain a NEW
* refresh_token that invalidates the old one. Always persist the new refresh_token
* if present, otherwise the next refresh will fail with AADSTS70043.
*/
export async function refreshMicrosoftTokens(params: {
clientId: string;
refreshToken: string;
}): Promise<{
access_token: string;
/** May be a NEW token (MS refresh token rotation). Persist this immediately. */
refresh_token: string;
expires_in: number;
}> {
const body = new URLSearchParams({
grant_type: "refresh_token",
client_id: params.clientId,
refresh_token: params.refreshToken,
scope: MS_OAUTH_SCOPES,
});
const res = await fetch(MS_TOKEN_ENDPOINT, {
method: "POST",
headers: { "Content-Type": "application/x-www-form-urlencoded" },
body: body.toString(),
});
if (!res.ok) {
const errText = await res.text().catch(() => "unknown error");
throw new Error(`MS token refresh failed (${res.status}): ${errText}`);
}
const data = await res.json() as MicrosoftTokenResponse;
if (!data.access_token) {
throw new Error("MS refresh response missing access_token");
}
return {
access_token: data.access_token,
// MS may omit refresh_token if it didn't rotate — fall back to original
refresh_token: data.refresh_token ?? params.refreshToken,
expires_in: data.expires_in,
};
}
/**
* Extracts the email claim from a Microsoft ID-token (JWT).
* The ID-token is a standard JWT — we only need the payload, no signature
* verification required here because:
* 1. We received it directly from Microsoft's token endpoint over HTTPS.
* 2. We don't rely on it for auth decisions — just for extracting the email
* to store in mail_connections.email.
*
* Claims checked (in order): email → preferred_username → upn
*/
export function extractEmailFromIdToken(idToken: string): string | null {
try {
const [, payloadB64] = idToken.split(".");
if (!payloadB64) return null;
const payload = JSON.parse(Buffer.from(payloadB64, "base64url").toString("utf8"));
return (
payload.email ??
payload.preferred_username ??
payload.upn ??
null
);
} catch {
return null;
}
}